Guardiola’s Plan B provides City with a glorious European night

Over-thinker. The term that’s often revolving around Pep Guardiola after Champions League exits. Well not from the people around him certainly

“Pep, was that almost the perfect tactical plan tonight for you ?” he was asked after the game.

“Because we won” replied Guardiola sarcastically. “Doesn’t count that. It’s because we won, it’s a tactical. Doesn’t work in that way” he continued.

The term tactical is only brought up once a team wins. That’s what Guardiola was probably hinting at. Even if Manchester City had lost, their ideas were clear in both halves. Real Madrid and Zinedine probably had their ideas as well.

Theory is trained on during the weeks leading to the game. It then becomes practice. There are multiple variables affecting the implementation. Type of players, players form, their mental wellness. It’s not even one player. Eleven.

Then throughout 90 minutes ideas are judged by spectators who mostly don’t have the qualifications necessary to manage a Sunday League team. Should have done this, that. Should play left, right, central. Opinions, Options, Opinions.

The variables affecting 90 minutes of football are numerous. Before and during the game. So going from theory passing through practice and implementation to reach the final outcome faces a lot of bumps in the road.

So what does all that Mumbo Jumbo mean ? It means that judging two multiple Champions League winning managers based on a two legged tie is insufficient. Analysis is different, and that’s what I have got for you here. It’s what happened and the ideas. The echos after the game could have been different had City lost. The “perfect tactical plan” could have been “Pep overthinks big games”.

Results oriented judgement is easier. You can just flick through your live score application and decide which of the two managers is shite. Or check a ‘static’ display of formation in a dynamic game of football. Even two identical formations would have different approaches once the game is in play.

Anyway….here’s the analysis.

City started the game in a 4–4–2 block when out of possession. In possession it was more of a 3–2–4–1 with Gabriel Jesus moving from left wing to a forward position as Benjamin Mendy occupied the left flank. Gabriel Jesus ? Left wing ? What was he doing there.

Well it didn’t start like that. In a very common Guardiola approach, he would start with a shape then change in the first five minutes. At first it was Bernardo Silva on the left and Jesus upfront.

Then they switched for the rest of the game. Silva upfront next to Kevin De Bruyne out of possession and Jesus on the left. It was in this moment the switch happened.

4–4–2 out of possession with De Bruyne and Bernardo Silva upfront, while Riyad Mahrez and Jesus occupied the wings. “We decide to play without proper striker for the way they defend. They defend [in] special way, they are so aggressive.” Guardiola elaborated after the game. Two approaches were built on this.

First, in normal operations when City progressed through midfield and during offensive transitions Jesus would go inside, attacking the center space but starting from the left wing. Meanwhile De Bruyne and Bernardo Silva dropped to provide him that space.

In the 20th minute De Bruyne was central as planned and outside of the picture was Jesus making a run from the left, towards the center.

De Bruyne’s pass was perfectly placed in between Raphael Varane and Dani Carvajal for the incoming Jesus.

A different angle further illustrates the idea. The center is free at the start of the attack, but Jesus is sprinting from the left wing towards that free area. Jesus reached the ball but his shot was denied by Thibaut Courtois.

35th minute and a quick City attack. Bernardo finds De Bruyne in the center and the Belgian already knows what he’s going to do. Plays a quick one touch pass in behind Varane for Jesus. It’s noticeable here how high Mahrez and Jesus are when compared to De Bruyne and Bernardo.

Jesus should have probably started his angled run towards the center earlier. Had he done that, he would have intercepted the ball with his body facing Courtois in a 1 v 1 scenario. He’s late however.

It wasn’t always Jesus’ fault. Here him and Mahrez are perfecting positioned, making runs towards the center when starting from out wide. Again, it’s clear that they are positioned higher up the pitch than De Bruyne and Bernardo. Jesus makes the perfect run inside but De Bruyne decides to play it wide to Mendy rather than towards the center space.

It wasn’t Jesus’ day — yet. Another excellent run from the left wing towards the center but Ilkay Gundogan just like De Bruyne decides to go wide. Gundogan should have played it inside towards the space between Varane and Sergio Ramos. Jesus was attacking the correct space and the pass was much clearer than that of De Bruyne’s. Till that moment, City were unlucky but the idea of Jesus attacking the center space starting from wide left was close to reap the rewards.

Secondly, Mahrez’s runs inside. The Algerian would do similar runs to Jesus however mainly from deep long balls when City had moved Real Madrid further up the field. Here he moves inside from the right wing to collect a long ball from Ederson. Unfortunately for him, he miss-controls the ball.

The scene would re-occur. Long ball from Ederson towards the center where Mahrez would move inside to collect freely. Had he controlled the ball here, he could have played De Bruyne into a 1 v 1 scenario against Courtois.

It was 3rd time lucky for the Algerian. His move inside behind Ramos in the 55th minute was spotted by Gundogan and the German played the ball behind Madrid’s defence.

Mahrez should have scored here, but his shot was poor and Courtois managed to save it.

City failed to turn these chances and half chances into goals. Moreover, their frequent mistakes in the defence showed up again. After some errors from the City defence Isco managed to give Real Madrid the lead in the tie.

Zidane’s side had the upper hand until Guardiola introduced Raheem Sterling and changed City’s approach. Moving to a 4–2–3–1in possession with De Bruyne behind Jesus and Sterling on the left. In a number 10 position De Bruyne roamed to the left channel.

The idea was that after Zidane moved Federico Valverede to the right wing to double up with Carvajal against Mendy and Sterling, the Belgian can operate in the left channel un-tracked. Here, his pass into Sterling is intercepted by Casemiro. Yet, Casemiro wasn’t in the correct place in the next attacks.

After City were pressing Madrid’s right sided build up, De Bruyne kept lingering towards the left channel. Meanwhile the 2 v 2 in that side was still in place with the four players mentioned before (Mendy, Valverde, Sterling and Carvajal) fighting for possession of the ball.

City manage to collect it and restart the attack. Valverde is still marking Mendy, while Carvajal is sprinting back to keep tabs of Sterling’s run. All of that is happening whilst De Bruyne is positioning himself in the exact space he needs to be in. The left channel, away from Casemiro.

Gundogan’s long ball falls for Sterling. The winger then tries to adjust but he’s confronted by the duo of Varane and Casemiro. This in return completely frees De Bruyne as Valverde who’s out of the screen is still tracking Mendy.

Valverde is late and De Bruyne manages to penetrate Real Madrid’s block.

De Bruyne then reverses his direction to be on his right foot. Mahrez and Jesus’ positioning here offers the Belgian two options. A cut-back to Mahrez or far post to Jesus. De Bruyne opts for the latter, but other than the options it’s Mahrez positioning that frees the far post by attracting Ferland Mendy. Jesus managed to score and made it 1–1.

Perhaps this snippet perfectly illustrates City’s approach after switching to 4–2–3–1. Valverde and Carvajal tracking Mendy and Sterling respectively, City progressing through the middle and finally the most important part. De Bruyne in the left channel free behind Casemiro.

Rodri manages to find De Bruyne. The freedom and space he has gives him time to assess his options. With Valverde and Casemiro out of sight, Sterling who played 73 minutes less than Carvajal can utilize his 1 v 1 abilities to bypass the defender. De Bruyne goes with the correct option and plays Sterling.

One of City’s qualities that Guardiola keeps banging about is the wingers’ 1 v 1 ability. Here, Sterling proves that by speeding past Carvajal and forcing him into a penalty. A penalty miss would have meant that City’s last 5 different takers missed. That didn’t happen though as De Bruyne struck it into the bottom right corner to make it 2–1. Both of City’s goals originated from De Bruyne’s positioning in the left channel. The late switch had reaped the rewards.

City and Guardiola came to Madrid ready. Their initial approach and second one worked. Yet had the score stayed at 1–0 to Zidane’s side, City and Guardiola would have been criticized for their “over-thinking”.

Theory and practice go hand in hand. It’s easy to blame one when it could have been the other. For City, both worked out to give their team one of their most memorable European nights.